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1. The Golden Thread 
The presumption of innocence is a keystone of many criminal justice systems. In criminal 
trials, the defendant is formally considered “innocent until proven guilty.” The burden of 
proof is on the state to prove the defendant committed all elements of the crime; the 
defendant, by contrast, need not prove his innocence. This asymmetry was famously dubbed 
“the golden thread” of criminal law.1 Correspondingly in many legal systems, such as Anglo-
American common law, the defendant in civil cases enjoys a presumption of non-culpability; 
the burden falls to the plaintiff to establish the facts of the case.  
 
A legal burden of proof generates a formal standard of proof. This is the standard to which 
the facts must be established to satisfy the burden. Formal standards include the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard in the US, which is required for a brief stop and search.2 A slightly higher 
standard, “probable cause,” is required for detentions, arrests and indictments, and for more 
substantial searches of persons and property. When quantified, the thresholds for satisfying 
the standards are typically glossed as around 10–50% and 30–60% confidence, respectively, 
that the person is participating in criminal activity (McCauliff 1982; Lerner 2003; Bacigal 2004; 
Goldberg 2013). 
 
The “preponderance of evidence” standard, usually understood as requiring that a claim is 
more likely true than not, operates in civil and family courts. The standard is typically 
quantified as exceeding 50% likelihood that the litigated facts obtain.3 The “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard, frequently quantified as around 65–75% confidence, is more 
demanding. This standard is employed in equity cases such as right-to-die hearings, wills, libel, 
child custody, paternity disputes, and commitment to mental institutions.4  
 
The proof “beyond reasonable doubt” standard, which is required for criminal conviction in 
many jurisdictions, is more demanding still. It is one of the most familiar aspects of criminal 
law and is commonly understood to be around 90–95% confidence in the guilt of the 
defendant (Tribe 1971; Laudan 2011; Walen 2015; Mulrine 1997; Lippke 2010). 
 
                                                        
1  Lord Sankey in Woolmington v DPP (1935) AC 462. The burden of proof for some claims – such as 
affirmative defenses or immunities from prosecution – falls to the defendant. 
2  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
3  This standard is also known as the “balance of probabilities” standard (In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371–72; 
House of Lords in Re B (A Child) (2008) UKHL 35). For information about quantifying the standard, see 
McCauliff (1982); Simon (1969).  
4  See McCauliff (1982); Simon and Mahan (1971); United States v. Fatico, 458 F Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); 
Sand and Rose (2003).  
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Burdens of proof and their associated standards raise many epistemological questions. 
Questions concern whether the presumption of innocence is a propositional attitude, the 
nature of this attitude or stance, and whether it is appropriate. There are questions about how 
to interpret, and what legitimates, the various standards of proof.5 In this essay I examine 
whether these standards can be properly understood in quantitative terms and how this affects 
the kinds of evidence that can satisfy the standard. In section two I introduce examples that 
suggest legal standards of proof cannot be properly interpreted in quantitative terms. In 
sections three, four, and five I evaluate three competing proposals for a non-quantitative 
epistemic condition on satisfying legal burdens of proof.   
 
2. Statistical Evidence  
Consider the following cases:6  
 
Underage Alcohol. Reliable studies establish that at most undergraduate house parties, underage 
drinking is ubiquitous. The local police force decides this base rate evidence satisfies the reasonable 
suspicion standard. On this basis they search underage individuals arriving at undergraduate parties.7 
 
Gatecrasher. A music venue sells seats at its event but does not issue, or record who purchases, tickets. 
One day the gate is left open and, taking advantage of the lack of ticketing system, many people 
gatecrash. The managers realize only 10 seats were sold, but 80 people attended. They call the police, 
who arrest some attendees for gatecrashing. The police reason that there is probable cause to arrest any 
attendee, since it is overwhelmingly likely they committed a crime (Cohen 1977).8 
 
Red Taxi. A vehicle hit Jeanette late one night. She could determine it was a taxi, but could not discern 
the color. The Red Taxi company operates 75% of taxis in town. The remaining 25% are operated by 
the Green Taxi company. Jeanette sues the Red Taxi company. Using only the evidence described here, 
Jeanette reasons, she will win the case, because it is more likely than not that Red Taxi is liable.9     
 
Uncertain Paternity. Magda does not know who fathered her child. She knows it is one of two lovers, 
and asks them to undergo DNA testing. Owing to disorganization at the laboratory, both samples 
become adulterated. Statistical analysis cannot generate the high certainty characteristic of flawless DNA 
testing but reports a 90% likelihood that Tom is the father. Since paternity tests are expensive, Magda 
reasons this evidence ought to suffice for her paternity suit, which only requires “clear and convincing 
evidence”.  
 
Prison Yard. One hundred prisoners exercise in the prison yard. Ninety-nine prisoners together initiate 
a premeditated attack on a guard. Security footage reveals one prisoner standing against the wall refusing 
to participate. There is no evidence indicating who refused to participate. The prison officials decide 
that since for each prisoner it is 99% likely they are guilty, they have adequate evidence to successfully 
prosecute individual prisoners for assault (Nesson 1979). 
                                                        
5  See, for example, Laudan (2011; 2012) and rebuttals by Risinger (2010) and Gardiner (2017a). See also Lerner 
(2003); Walen (2015); Mulrine (1997); Nesson (1979); Pardo and Allen (2008); and Sand and Rose (2003) 
6  I include five kinds of example partly because readers unconvinced by one might find a different example 
compelling, and partly to provide an example for each standard of proof outlined above. For related examples 
and discussion, see Tribe (1971); Redmayne (2008); Koehler (2001); Schneps and Colmez (2013); Thomson 
(1986); Buchak (2014); Moss (2018: chapter 10); and People v. Collins 68 Cal.2d 319, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497 (1968). 
7  This case is inspired by Kerr (2012).  
8  Note the example is usually employed to illuminate the preponderance of evidence standard rather than 
probable cause.   
9  This case was first discussed in print in Tribe (1971). Tribe refers to the case as a “famous chestnut” (p. 1341). 
See also Thomson (1986); Nesson (1985); Smith v. Rapid Transit 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945); 
Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp. 288 N.W. 2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App., 1980).   
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In each case brute statistical evidence plausibly licenses a relatively high credence in the target 
claim. If the burden of proof can be satisfied by statistical evidence alone, these vignettes 
exemplify satisfying the relevant burdens. But there is something dubious about these cases. 
Law courts would not adjudicate in favor of the claimants and the police would likely violate 
their code of conduct were they to act on this basis (Koehler 2001).   
 
For each vignette, furthermore, we can construct a comparison case in which non-statistical, 
“individualized” evidence is employed instead. The overall likelihood of the disputed fact 
given the evidence might be lower, yet the burden seems satisfied. Consider the following case:   
 
Red Taxi Testimony. A vehicle hit Jeanette late one night. The Red Taxi company operates 50% of taxis 
in town. The Green Taxi company operates the remaining 50%. Jeanette claims she saw the taxi was 
red. Eyewitness reports are notoriously unreliable, and so tests are performed to determine Jeanette’s 
reliability under the relevant conditions. She discerns the correct color 70% of the time. Her eyewitness 
testimony thus suggests a red taxi caused the accident. With this evidence Jeanette sues the Red Taxi 
company. (See Thomson 1986; Tversky and Kahneman 1982.) 
 
In some sense, this eyewitness evidence is less determinative: plausibly a red taxi is more likely 
at fault given the mere market share evidence in the original example. But finding liability in 
the second case seems more legitimate and courts are significantly more likely to find in the 
plaintiff’s favor. Similar counterparts can be constructed for each of the five vignettes above.  
 
These cases suggest the standard of proof is not a quantitative measure, such as a credence or 
statistical likelihood. If “preponderance of evidence” could be captured numerically, for 
example, it would be lower than 75%. And this would mean, implausibly, the fact finder should 
find liability in the Red Taxi case. Similarly if “beyond reasonable doubt” can be understood 
quantitatively, it must be lower than 99% confidence. This would entail, implausibly, statistical 
evidence in the prison yard case suffices for conviction. Questions about whether merely 
statistical evidence can satisfy a burden of proof are increasingly pressing, as cold hit DNA or 
fingerprint matches and other statistical approaches to evidence are becoming more 
prevalent.10 (“Cold hits” are when a database search connects a hitherto unconnected 
perpetrator to a crime.) This raises the question: if the standard of proof is not simply a 
numerical likelihood, and if merely statistical evidence does not satisfy that standard, what 
other conditions are required to satisfy the burden of proof? 
 
3. Causal Relations and Guarantees 
Legal theorists note that vignettes like the first five above lack “individualized” evidence 
against the defendant. But this notion is itself opaque. Judith Jarvis Thomson (1986) aims to 
illuminate the nature and value of individualized evidence. She argues individualized evidence 
is that which is appropriately causally connected to the target claim. This causal relation might 
be that the evidence caused the crime. Gambling debt, for example, might be individualized 
evidence of guilt if debt motivated the theft. Thomson calls this “forward-looking” 
individualized evidence. Alternatively crime can cause evidence. The crime’s occurring, for 
                                                        
10  For recent advances in statistical approaches to legal evidence, see Pardo (2013); Schneps and Colmez (2013); 
Koehler (2001); Kaye (2009); Roth (2010); Slatkin, Song and Murphy (2009); Tribe (1971); Goldberg (2013).  
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example, causes incriminating fingerprints. Thomson calls this “backward-looking” 
individualized evidence. Finally, evidence and crime might have a common cause. Suppose the 
defendant verbally abused an officer one evening. This might be evidence the defendant later 
attacked a pedestrian because it indicates a common cause – the defendant was enraged that 
evening – for both incidents. 
 
Evidence with an appropriate causal relation, Thomson argues, supplies epistemic import 
distinct from merely raising the likelihood of the disputed claim. Individualized evidence, in 
her view, “guarantees” the claim is true (Thomson 1986: 206, 208–9, 214). In the Red Taxi 
Testimony case, the taxi’s being red causally explains the eyewitness evidence. Eyewitness 
evidence can therefore guarantee, argues Thomson, the litigated taxi-color claim. Thomson 
writes, “to require individualized evidence of guilt just is to be requiring a guarantee” 
(Thomson 1986: 214).  
 
Thomson notes the similarity to lottery cases in epistemology (Thomson 1986: 207–208).11 
Statistical evidence about lotteries can highly probabilify the claim that a specific ticket lost, 
but does not guarantee it. Lottery results printed in the newspaper, by contrast, can guarantee 
the ticket lost. As with individualized evidence of a litigated fact, newspaper evidence can, in 
Thomson’s view, guarantee the ticket lost even if the likelihood of false belief from newspaper 
evidence is higher than the likelihood of false belief via merely statistical evidence. (This can 
happen if, for example, the newspaper-reported lottery is smaller and there is some chance the 
newspaper misprinted the numbers.)   
 
Thomson’s suggestion has virtues. Statistical evidence, at least in the above kinds of cases, 
characteristically lacks a causal relation to the disputed claim. And statistical evidence plausibly 
fails to provide a guarantee: even excellent statistical evidence is straightforwardly consistent 
with the target claim’s falsity. Individualized evidence, by contrast, typically has a causal 
relation and can characteristically – in some sense – generate a guarantee. If a person is 
convicted even though no evidence is causally related to the putative crime, furthermore, this 
seems inconsistent with justice; the defendant’s crime has no bearing on whether he is 
convicted.12 
 
But there are weaknesses in Thomson’s account. Firstly, absent a more precise conception of 
causation, the account remains schematic. Causation is a notoriously “murky,” elastic notion, 
and Thomson does not specify the causal relation her account employs.13 
 
Some base rates are plausibly causally related to some litigated claims, furthermore, which 
suggests that lack of causal relation fails to capture the inadequacy of merely statistical 
evidence. If local gang membership rates are sufficiently high, for example, this base rate can 
causally contribute to an individual participating in an illegal gang initiation rite. Since it is 
                                                        
11  Discussion of lottery cases in epistemology stems from Kyburg (1961). See also Nelkin (2000) and Hawthorne 
(2004). 
12  I sometimes, for concision, use terminology specific to one kind of legal burden, such as criminal trials, even 
though the ideas apply equally to other burdens of proof. 
13  Enoch et al. (2012); Enoch and Fisher (2013); Redmayne (2008); and Blome-Tillmann (2015) raise similar 
concerns. The term “murky” appears in Redmayne (2008: 300).   
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causal, the base rate is a candidate for forward-looking evidence, but nonetheless is statistical. 
The statistical evidence in the uncertain paternity case above is plausibly caused by paternity; 
if so, this is backward-looking causal evidence that is nonetheless statistical.14 Base rates can 
be causally related to a common cause. Perhaps in some cases religious tenets causally 
contribute both to rates of domestic violence within that religion and a particular instance of 
domestic violence. Despite these causal relations, base rate evidence seems illegitimate for 
satisfying the burden of proof and is (arguably) unindividualized.  
 
Realistic social base rate evidence does not typically generate high statistical likelihood (and 
tends to be complex). In the following fictional examples base rate statistics are high and so 
are a potential candidate for sufficient evidence.15 
 
First Gatecrasher. A music venue sells seats at its event, but does not issue, or record who purchases, 
tickets. Fern notices the gate is open, and decides to gatecrash. Other people see her gatecrashing and 
decide to follow. The managers realize only 10 seats were sold but 80 people attended, and summon 
the police. Fern happens to be one of the people apprehended. The statistical evidence against Fern is 
deemed sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof, since it is overwhelmingly likely she gatecrashed. 
 
Opportunistic Gatecrasher. A music venue sells seats at its event, but does not issue, or record who 
purchases tickets. One day the gate is left open and, taking advantage of the lack of ticketing system, 
many people gatecrash. Oppy walks past the venue and realizes many people are gatecrashing. Oppy 
sees this as opportunity to gatecrash, and so joins in. The managers realize only 10 seats were sold, but 
80 people attended. Oppy is one of those arrested. The statistical evidence against Oppy is deemed 
sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof, since it is overwhelmingly likely he gatecrashed. 
 
In these cases, arguably the statistical evidence is causally related to the person’s guilt, yet is 
not individualized, does not generate a guarantee, and should not satisfy a burden of proof. 
But according to the letter of Thomson’s account, the statistical evidence, by being causally 
related, qualifies as individualized. Since the statistics render guilt likely, Thomson’s account 
cannot explain why they do not suffice for conviction. This objection is pressed in Blome-
Tillmann (2015). 
 
Responses are available. By refining the account of causation, one might deny Fern caused the 
statistic. There were, after all, many intervening causes. It is implausible, however, that an 
account of causation is available where gambling debt causes the theft but the high proportion 
of gatecrashers does not cause Oppy’s opportunistic gatecrashing. A second response posits 
the way the statistic causes Oppy’s crime, by providing motivation or cover, is importantly 
disconnected from how it epistemically supports guilt, namely by establishing a base rate 
likelihood. Perhaps, then, the case does not undermine the spirit of Thomson’s proposal. 
Thirdly, advocates of a causal account of the epistemic difference between statistical and 
individualized evidence might argue the statistical evidence against Oppy is not itself causal, 
perhaps because it is abstract. For the evidence to be causal one must incorporate that Oppy 
                                                        
14  For more on DNA evidence and the distinction between statistical and individualized evidence, see Di Bello 
(2013); Pritchard (forthcoming); Stein (2005); Kaye and Sensabaugh (2000).  
15  The first gatecrasher and opportunistic gatecrasher cases are from Blome-Tillmann (2015). Blome-Tillmann 
mistakenly claims Thomson’s account is not vulnerable to the opportunistic gatecrasher case (Blome-
Tillmann 2015: 110). This is because Blome-Tillmann overlooks forward-looking evidence in Thomson’s 
account, such as evidence of motive. 
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notices the high proportion of gatecrashers, which motivates him. But then, the response 
continues, the evidence qualifies as causal precisely because one includes an individualized, 
not purely statistical, aspect.  
 
An alternative line of response argues that the existence of cases illustrating that sometimes brute 
statistical evidence is causally related to the target fact does not undermine Thomson’s 
account; Thomson identifies why brute statistical evidence is characteristically inadequate for 
conviction. Thomson’s account explains that merely statistical evidence characteristically 
cannot guarantee the disputed fact, but individualized evidence – evidence with appropriate 
causal relations to the fact – characteristically can. Thus a refined version of Thomson’s causal 
account may avoid these criticisms.  
 
This response raises a second set of concerns about Thomson’s account. It is unclear how 
causal relations generate a guarantee, or indeed what Thomson means by “guarantee”. A 
witness might testify that although she thinks the perpetrator wore sandals, she cannot recall 
the incident well. A causal relationship obtains – the witness believes this because the 
perpetrator wore sandals – but the evidence cannot provide a guarantee. We might speculate 
that if Jones stole, his debt was a cause. But we are unsure whether he stole and, if so, whether 
debt was a motive. These pieces of evidence offer no guarantee. It is unclear from Thomson’s 
account why combining evidence of this kind is epistemically or legally superior to statistical 
evidence. Perhaps lottery-style, statistical evidence provides a greater guarantee than 
combining many unreliable, but individualized, considerations.  
 
To further cleave guarantees from causally connected evidence, note there can be non-causal 
facts that generate guarantees. These might include facts of legal definition, such as if the 
accused performed certain actions he thereby committed an offence, or medical diagnosis, 
such as if the witness has specific traits then he has a particular disorder. A lawyer might 
articulate entailment relations such as if three people conspired as alleged, then at least three 
people knew the plan in advance. Evidence can include mathematical testimony from expert 
witnesses. Cold hit DNA evidence is typically characterized as statistical and, if the DNA is 
unmixed and non-degraded, produces a virtual certainty (Devik 2006; Schneps and Colmez 
2013: 69).16 These examples of non-causal evidence do not, by themselves, satisfy a burden of 
proof. The prosecutor must determine, for example, that the DNA would not have been at 
the crime scene were the defendant innocent. But although DNA evidence has a causal 
element, the statistical reasoning guarantees some facts of the case, such as whether the 
accused’s DNA was found at the scene. These examples illustrate that non-causal evidence 
can provide guarantees during a trial, which raises the question of whether and how causal 
relations generate a distinctive guarantee. 
 
Perhaps the guarantee arises because causal relations can only obtain if the crime occurred. 
Jones’s committing the crime did not cause eyewitness beliefs, for example, unless he 
committed the crime. But this is a trivial sense of guarantee and cannot be what Thomson 
intended. It is divorced from our epistemic state; fact finders do not know whether the causal 
                                                        
16  If the DNA test is performed correctly and if – as geneticists contend – the locations of the 13 peaks in 
genetic code are mutually independent, the probability that two people share a DNA match is 1/400 trillion. 
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relation between the evidence and the litigated fact holds unless they know whether the 
litigated fact obtains. So the logic of causation does not provide reasoners with a guarantee. 
The relation holds objectively, and is not one to which we have independent epistemic access. 
 
To develop Thomson’s account, more must be said about the relation between individualized 
evidence and guarantees. In section five I articulate one way we might understand this 
connection.  
 
As noted above, a causal relation does not obtain unless the relata exist. This generates a 
further problem for Thomson’s account.17 If individualized evidence requires a causal relation, 
how is individualized evidence possible when the putative fact does not obtain or where the 
evidence misleads? If the defendant is innocent, his (putative) guilt cannot stand in any causal 
relationship to evidence. But then, according to Thomson’s account, there is no individualized 
evidence. This is problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, evidence can be individualized, 
as opposed to merely statistical, regardless of whether it misleads and whether the accused is 
innocent. Secondly, it is a desideratum of an account of legal evidence that – if evidence is 
compelling but misleading – the burden can be satisfied even if the judgment is false. A police 
officer can have legitimate reasonable suspicion, for example, when no crime is afoot and an 
innocent defendant can appear guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The causal account owes an 
explanation of how misleading evidence can be individualized. 
 
To conclude this section I articulate two further worries concerning Thomson’s account of 
the connections amongst individualized, causally-related, and guarantee-providing evidence. 
Thomson holds evidence is individualized only when uniquely identifying. She writes,  
 
Mrs. Smith believes she saw a one-legged, left-handed, entirely bald, and extremely tall man kill Bloggs. 
That is individualized evidence that a man with those four features killed Bloggs, for the (putative) fact 
that a man with those four features killed Bloggs would causally explain Mrs. Smith’s believing she saw 
a man with those four features kill Bloggs… There are [99 other men in the world in addition to Mullins] 
who have all four features, so getting individualized evidence against Mullins requires getting some fact in respect of 
which an appropriate causal role is played by a feature which distinguishes Mullins from [all other men in the world]. 
In the revised version of the case, Mrs. Smith believes she saw a one-legged, left-handed, 
entirely bald, extremely tall, and one-eyed man kill Bloggs… [O]ur further evidence suggests that only 
Mullins has all five features… To the extent to which we believe that further evidence, then, we shall 
take ourselves to have individualized evidence, not merely that a man with those five features killed 
Bloggs, but that Mullins did – he being the only available candidate with the five features (Thomson 
1986: 217, emphasis mine). 
 
The italicized condition would help underwrite a guarantee of guilt. But as a condition on 
individualized evidence, it is too strong. Evidence can be individualized and against the 
defendant without being uniquely identifying or conclusive. This point echoes Donnellan’s 
and Kripke’s objection to descriptivism as a semantics for proper names: we can have a de re, 
individualizing thought about something without being able to uniquely discriminate it 
(Donnellan 1972; Kripke 1972). This underscores that individualized evidence is far from a 
guarantee of guilt, at least in the strong, ordinary sense of “guarantee.”  
 
                                                        
17  Blome-Tillmann (2015) raises a version of this worry.  
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Secondly, the notion of “guarantee” arguably sits uncomfortably with lower standards. 
Thomson extends her account from criminal to civil burdens. According to Thomson, 
different standards of proof correspond to how sure fact finders are of having a guarantee of 
culpability. She writes,    
 
Our law requires the jury in a criminal case to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty before imposing liability on him; the friend of individualized evidence may be taken to say that 
the jury must be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty because of being sure 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are facts available to it which guarantee that the defendant is 
guilty. Our law requires the jury in a case in tort to believe no more than that it is more probable than 
not that the defendant is guilty; the friend of individualized evidence may be taken to say that the jury 
must believe it is more probable than not that the defendant is guilty because of believing it more 
probable than not that there are facts available to it which guarantee that the defendant is guilty 
(Thomson 1986: 215, 219). 
 
We might further extend this treatment: to satisfy a “clear and compelling evidence” standard 
fact finders must believe they have clear and compelling evidence that that there are facts 
available to them which guarantee the defendant is liable; to satisfy a “reasonable suspicion” 
standard the officer must believe she has reasonable suspicion that that there are facts available 
to her which guarantee that crime is afoot.  
 
But our ordinary notion of “guarantee” seems inappropriate for understanding standards 
lower than beyond reasonable doubt. Plausibly finding fault in civil cases does not require any 
evidence or chance of a guarantee of liability, for example, instead simply requiring a certain 
level of epistemic support. Perhaps a court can appropriately find in favor of the plaintiff, in 
other words, even if no evidence purports to guarantee liability, but the preponderance of 
available evidence indicates liability.  
 
Thomson’s account of the inadequacy of statistical evidence appears unsuccessful as it stands. 
To render the view more compelling, we need a better understanding of the relevant notion 
of guarantee, the causal relation, and how causal relations underwrite guarantees.  
 
4. Sensitivity and Incentives 
An alternative view holds that merely statistical evidence cannot satisfy a legal burden because 
legal standards of proof require one’s judgment to be sensitive to the truth of the litigated 
facts.18 Enoch et al. (2012) and Enoch and Fisher (2013) argue the deficiency of merely 
statistical evidence is that it obtains regardless of the particular crime, and so a belief based on 
statistical evidence would be held even were the accused innocent. Individualized evidence, by 
contrast, characteristically engenders sensitive beliefs; if the defendant did not commit the 
crime, the individualized evidence would not obtain.19  
 
Sensitivity of Beliefs. S’s belief that p is sensitive iff had it not been the case that p, S 
(likely) would not have believed p. 
 
                                                        
18  For information on sensitivity see Nozick (1981) and DeRose (1996). For a sensitivity-based approach to 
lottery cases in epistemology see Dretske (1971) and DeRose (forthcoming: chapter 5).   
19  At least, those beliefs are sensitive in the good case; see discussion below.   
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Extending the notion of sensitivity of beliefs suggests a corresponding “sensitivity of 
evidence”: Evidence is sensitive to a claim iff (roughly speaking) were the claim false, the 
evidence would likely not obtain.20  
 
Enoch et al.’s suggestion enjoys a great deal of plausibility. It is plausibly a principle of justice 
and good reasoning that a person should not be found culpable unless evidence used to 
convict is counterfactually dependent on the crime. The conviction should be sensitive to the 
transgression. The court should be able to assert that if the accused did not the commit the 
crime, he would not have been convicted. Thomson’s suggestion employs the causation 
relation to unpack this idea; the sensitivity approach employs modal conditions.   
 
Enoch et al. argue, however, that sensitivity as an epistemic value does not have legal value 
and courts should not care about the sensitivity of their judgments (Enoch et al. 2013: 211–
215; Enoch and Fisher 2013: 577–581). Instead they advance a non-epistemic vindication of 
the legal value of sensitivity, and thus a practical vindication of the distinction between 
individualized and statistical evidence. They argue that relying on statistical evidence 
undermines incentives to obey the law. If evidence sufficient for finding culpable obtains 
regardless of whether the person transgresses, Enoch et al. reason, the person might as well 
transgress because “whatever he decides will have negligible influence on the likelihood of his 
being punished” (Enoch and Fisher 2013: 583). If purely statistical evidence suffices to satisfy 
the burden of proof, then a person deciding whether to purchase a ticket or gatecrash, for 
example, has no incentive (stemming from evidence law) to purchase the ticket. Similarly, taxi 
drivers lose their incentive to drive cautiously.  
 
I think this incentive-based explanation of the need for individualized evidence is mistaken. 
Firstly, consider the gatecrasher case, which is the example they select to illustrate their claims 
about incentive structures. In this case there remains an incentive to obey the law by not 
entering the venue; by not entering, the person avoids arrest. A more significant objection is 
that cases with the appropriate incentive structure are rare. Enoch at al.’s explanation only 
applies when the crime occurs regardless of whether the person participates, the person is 
already in the class of suspects to be investigated and will remain so regardless of whether he 
participates, the person must decide whether to participate in the law-breaking, and an 
investigation or other legal action will occur regardless of whether the person participates. 
Cases with this structure might include activities such as small-fry tax fraud, littering, and 
television license evasion. If defendants for these infractions were identified and prosecuted 
with purely statistical evidence, the incentive from legal evidence would arguably be 
diminished.21 But typically decisions about whether to transgress concern cases where the 
crime or harm to be investigated would not otherwise occur, and so no investigation would 
                                                        
20  Here the evidence must be understood with some imprecision. It is not that 70 people gatecrashed, for 
example, it is that many people gatecrashed. See also Blome-Tillmann (2015). 
21  Although I do not have space to develop this claim here, I believe Enoch et al. elide the distinction between 
statistical evidence being used to identify and convict the accused. If statistical evidence were used to identify 
suspects from the general population to prosecute, this might reduce incentives (from some aspects of 
evidence law) to not transgress. (Although even here, for reasons articulated below, I think the incentive-
based account cannot capture the nature of the wrong.) But the use of statistics proposed is convicting the 
suspect once identified. Given this, the incentive-based account is less successful.  
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occur but for the person’s transgressing. This includes almost all thefts, assaults, harassment, 
negligent accidents, embezzlement etc. So even with merely statistical evidence, incentive is 
provided: if the person had not transgressed, there would be no investigation or risk of 
punishment.  
  
Enoch et al. acknowledge this concern. They write, 
 
The incentive story thus has different implications across the two categories of cases: those in which 
the act would likely be performed by others regardless of whether the would-be perpetrator decides not 
to engage in it, and personal-context cases [such as spousal abuse], in which the act will not likely be 
carried out by anyone else. In the latter type of case, the statistical evidence against the defendant ought 
to be admissible at trial (Enoch and Fisher 2013: 608). 
 
What Enoch et al. fail to appreciate, I think, is that “the latter type of case” includes most 
crimes and liabilities. If Jones does not coldcock Williams on his way home, probably no one 
else will. Their incentive-based account, rather than vindicating the legal distinction between 
individualized and merely statistical evidence, instead vindicates the adequacy of statistical 
evidence in almost every instance.    
 
Allowing purely statistical evidence to satisfy the burden, furthermore, might well 
disincentivize crime: It lifts a restriction on admissible evidence, and thereby renders 
conviction more likely. 
 
Arguably the strongest case for Enoch et al.’s incentive-based account concerns drivers 
employed by the smaller taxi service. Drivers of green taxis will not be found liable in any case 
adjudicated solely by market share evidence. So perhaps they lose incentive (from legal 
evidence) if purely statistical evidence can satisfy a burden. But even in this instance the 
incentive-based account is uncompelling. To see why, note the difference between statistical 
evidence sufficing for a finding and statistical evidence being the only admissible evidence. If 
it were the only admissible evidence, green taxi drivers would have no incentive (from legal 
evidence) to drive cautiously: they would never be found liable. But since – regardless of 
whether statistical evidence suffices – other kinds of evidence are admissible, drivers retain 
incentives from legal evidence: for any particular accident, there is likely to be individualized 
incriminating evidence. Only in unusual cases would the court rely wholly on market share 
evidence.  
 
A further weakness of the incentive-based account is that even if merely statistical evidence is 
employed persons retain incentives from other sources, such as the motivation to not steal, 
feel guilty, be injured, or injure others. Enoch et al. do not mention these other incentives, but 
they dilute the importance of incentives stemming from legal evidence. 
 
Finally, Enoch et al.’s proposal, which concerns influencing one aspect of citizens’ incentive 
structures in some kinds of cases, does not provide adequate warrant for our response to the 
prospect of satisfying the burden of proof with purely statistical evidence. When we consider 
the cases described in section two, there seems something unjust about convicting, finding 
liable, arresting, searching, or detaining on purely statistical evidence. Plausibly those people 
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are wronged. But Enoch at al.’s incentive-based account, which is rooted in practical policy 
considerations, is not the right kind of explanation to vindicate those moral reactions.   
 
We can set aside Enoch et al.’s incentive-based explication of the distinction between 
individualized and statistical evidence. The question remains whether a sensitivity-based 
account explains the inadequacy of statistical evidence. As noted above, it seems remiss for a 
court to convict unless they would have acquitted were the defendant innocent. Plausibly this 
sensitivity-based epistemic condition itself has legal value. The idea merits investigation.  
 
The sensitivity account raises some similar concerns as the causal account. Some statistical 
evidence – or beliefs based on statistical evidence – is sensitive to the crime’s occurring, for 
example. Recall Fern the first gatecrasher and Oppy the opportunistic gatecrasher. In these 
cases, statistical evidence generates the relevant sensitivity counterfactuals. If Fern did not 
gatecrash, the statistical evidence would likely not have obtained. If Oppy had not gatecrashed, 
the courts would not have found him liable. Blome-Tillman holds that the latter counterfactual 
is true since had Oppy not gatecrashed he would not have entered the venue (Blome-Tillmann 
2015: 106–107).   
 
Some of the same responses are available: Like advocates of the causal account, advocates of 
the sensitivity account might argue the account identifies what is characteristically inadequate 
about employing statistical evidence to satisfy a burden, and the account is thereby consistent 
with some marginal instances in which statistical evidence generates sensitive beliefs. In 
response note that, assuming Tom is the father, statistical evidence in the uncertainty paternity 
case generates sensitive beliefs, and underwrites a sufficiently high likelihood, yet is inadequate 
for finding liability. This suggests that mundane, central kinds of statistical evidence engender 
sensitive beliefs.22   
 
A further problem for the proposal is that much individualized evidence is insensitive: 
regardless of whether the accused is culpable, there is incriminating individualized evidence 
against him. This can occur with misleading or inconclusive evidence. Perhaps, for example, 
the accused’s fingerprints are at the scene because he is an acquaintance of the victim. The 
fingerprints can feature in the prosecution’s narrative as individualized evidence, but may not 
be sensitive to the crime.  
 
Note too that sensitivity is factive; a belief cannot be sensitive unless true. This creates a 
challenge for a sensitivity account of the legal value of individualized evidence. To see why, 
consider a case in which the accused is innocent but there is compelling, misleading, 
incriminating, individualized evidence. To determine whether the fact finder’s belief is 
sensitive we must ask, “Were the accused innocent, would the fact finder believe he is 
innocent?” Since the defendant is actually innocent, the answer is no. No false conviction is 
sensitive. If the burden of proof requires that the judgment is sensitive, as the sensitivity 
account suggests, no false conviction satisfies the burden. But, as noted above, it is a 
desideratum of legal epistemology that some false convictions satisfy the burden.23   
                                                        
22  We must assume Tom is the father because sensitivity is factive: no false belief is sensitive. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer and Laura Callahan for helpful comments on these issues.   
23  This point is also made in Blome-Tillmann (2015) and Smith (2010).  
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Enoch et al. respond to these kinds of objections by arguing sensitivity is a hallmark of good 
individualized evidence, not just any individualized evidence; statistical evidence, by contrast, 
is insensitive even when it is good statistical evidence (Enoch et al. 2012: 209). But it bears 
noting that as an account of the characteristic virtue of individualized evidence over statistical 
evidence, it is a weakness of the sensitivity account that much individualized evidence is 
insensitive. In section five I explore whether a relation known as “normic support”, or a 
kindred relation, is a better hallmark of individualized evidence and can better explain its legal 
and epistemic value.   
 
5. Normic Support 
Many epistemologists hold that epistemic support concerns probabilification.24 They hold that 
a body of evidence E epistemically supports proposition p iff p is likely, given E, to be true; a 
body of evidence E1 epistemically supports proposition p more than E2 does iff p is more likely 
given E1 than given E2. 
 
Martin Smith (2010) challenges this orthodoxy. He notes that in the lottery case, purely 
statistical evidence can establish that it is extremely likely a particular ticket lost, but cannot 
justify outright belief that the ticket lost. Reading lottery results in a newspaper, on the other 
hand, can justify outright belief. Individualized evidence can justify belief even if the claim is 
more likely to be false than if it were based on purely statistical evidence.  
 
Smith argues that individualized evidence, but not statistical evidence, “normically supports” 
the target claim. Evidence normically supports a conclusion when, roughly speaking, given 
that evidence, p would normally be true. This notion of normalcy does not reduce to statistical 
frequency (Smith 2010: 16). If the evidence obtains yet p is false, some abnormality or 
malfunction has occurred. The error demands explanation. When evidence statistically 
indicates p but p is false, by contrast, it is not really an error; it is simply a case of “you win 
some you lose some” (Enoch et al. 2012: 208).   
 
Smith employs a possible worlds framework for understanding normic support. He writes,25  
 
A body of evidence E normically supports a proposition p just in case p is true in all the most normal 
worlds in which E is true. Alternately, E normically supports p just in case the most normal worlds in 
which E is true and p is true are more normal than any world in which E is true and p is false… A body 
of evidence E normically supports a proposition p more strongly than it normically supports a proposition 
q just in case the most normal worlds in which E is true and q is false are more normal than any world 
in which E is true and p is false (Smith ms: 20–21). 
 
There are concerns with this account of normic support and, in particular, the possible world 
framework proposed. One concern is that more normal claims receive more normically-
supportive evidence just in virtue of being normal. If p is adequately normal an intuitively 
irrelevant fact F will qualify as normically supporting p. Suppose p obtains in almost all normal 
words (p is “grass is green,” for example). Now consider an intuitively irrelevant fact F, such 
                                                        
24  See, for example, citations in section one of Smith (2010).  
25  See also Smith (2010: 16–17). The actual world may not be maximally normal; misleading individualized 
evidence is possible.  
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as “polar bear hind paws are elongated.” The normal F-worlds are p-worlds; the worlds where 
F is true and p is true are more normal than any world where F is true and p is false. This is 
because not-p worlds are almost all abnormal. And so the seemingly irrelevant fact F 
normically supports p. A related worry – one common to possible world analyses – concerns 
logical truths. Logical truth T, which obtains in all worlds and so obtains in all normal worlds, 
is normically supported by an irrelevant fact F, because normal F-worlds are T-worlds.   
 
Even if Smith’s understanding of the normic support relation is not correct, perhaps an 
epistemic support relation similar to Smith’s normic support can vindicate the distinction 
between individualized and merely statistical evidence.26 In what follows I use “normic 
support” to denote epistemic support relations that share key features with Smith’s proposal 
but may vary in the details. (In particular one might reject analyzing normic support in terms 
of possible worlds.27) Consider the first five vignettes in section two. Reflecting on what 
normally follows from the evidence plausibly illuminates various judgments about the cases. 
Insofar as it might seem permissible to search partying underage undergraduates, for example, 
this is because given the evidence they would normally have alcohol and their not having alcohol 
would be an abnormal, surprising fact. This might obtain, for instance, if underage partygoers 
exhibit hallmarks of drinking, such as vomiting in bushes. If a police search is conducted purely 
on statistical grounds, by contrast, it seems illegitimate. The uncertain paternity vignette 
stipulates the samples were mixed. Given this laboratory error, it is normal and does not 
demand further explanation if the results are misleading. And so we cannot rely on those 
results in court. If the tests were conducted with non-mixed DNA, by contrast, the match 
would normically support the paternity claim since error would demand explanation. Perhaps 
a normic support relation, then, can vindicate the epistemic and legal distinction between 
individualized and statistical evidence.  
 
If Smith’s normic support, or a kindred relation, is a condition on satisfying burdens of proof, 
this may illuminate some ethical concerns about “stop and frisk” tactics. Suppose many 
members of a demographic commit a particular crime. For any individual, given only 
demographic evidence, it is statistically relatively likely they commit the crime. And now 
suppose the police frisk an individual based solely on demographic evidence. If burdens of 
proof require only statistical likelihoods, the officer’s frisk would convey, “I judge (with 
reasonable suspicion, given only demographic evidence) it is statistically relatively likely the 
person committed the crime.” Given the stipulation, the judgment could be true and well-
grounded;28 arguably the judgment does not capture what is wrong with frisking. If instead the 
burden of proof concerns normalcy, the officer’s frisk conveys, “I judge (with reasonable 
                                                        
26  Smith (ms: 41ff.); Smith (2017) applies normic support to legal epistemology.  
27  For discussions of normalcy, see Pettit (1999); Millikan (1984); Nickel (2008); Schurz (2001); Haslanger 
(2014); Morreau (1997); Spohn (2014); and Hauska (2008). Gardiner (2015) discusses the relationship between 
possible worlds and normalcy. Normalcy is not usually discussed by philosophers as a subject matter, but 
instead the notion of normalcy is used to illuminate other areas, such as character in ethical theory, 
populations in philosophy of biology, illness in philosophy of disability, conditionals in metaphysics, ceteris 
paribus laws in philosophy of science, generics in philosophy of language, and in the semantics for 
nonmonotonic logic. I am very grateful to Bernhard Nickel, Liz Camp, and Martin Smith for helpful insights 
on these topics.  
28  Although see Gardiner (forthcoming), which argues that many such judgments are not supported by the 
evidence.  
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suspicion, given the evidence) it is normal that the person committed the crime; if the person 
has not committed the crime it is a departure from normalcy.” Plausibly this judgment, unlike 
the first, is a condemnation of the individual or their group. It is wrong to judge with only 
demographic evidence that someone would normally transgress. Thus part of the moral 
seriousness of “stop and frisk” may stem from the nature of the burden of proof. 
 
Appealing to the idea of normalcy may illuminate promising aspects of the causal and 
sensitivity accounts. Causal relations often generate normic support relations. If an accident 
causes eyewitness evidence indicating the taxi was red, for example, normally the taxi is red. If 
the liable taxi is not red, this is abnormal and demands explanation. Evidence that normically 
supports a conclusion typically underwrites the belief’s sensitivity. Enoch et al. note that 
sensitivity and normic support often correlate, but remain agnostic about which is 
explanatorily more basic. They suggest normic support is less basic because the notion of 
“which errors call for explanation” seems unilluminating and opaque (Enoch et al. 2012: 210). 
Enoch et al. are correct that “what calls for explanation” is a poor candidate for an explanatory 
foundation. But this is not the heart of normic support; it is simply a characteristic feature. 
Normic support is a relation of epistemic support; plausibly it generates facts about which 
beliefs are sensitive and about which errors demand explanation. If a belief is insensitive, in 
other words, plausibly this is because the evidence fails to normically support the belief. 
Normic support seems the more basic notion.29  
 
Thomson argues that an epistemically valuable feature of individualized evidence is that it –  
unlike statistical evidence – can provide a guarantee. I noted above this notion was 
underdescribed in Thomson’s account. Perhaps a normic support relation can illuminate this 
“guarantee.” If evidence normically supports p, and yet not p, something is amiss and is not 
as it seems. The error demands explanation because something abnormal has occurred. 
Perhaps this is the kind of guarantee demanded by the burden of proof.  
 
Enoch et al. demur. They write,  
 
Why should the law especially care about avoiding mistakes that call for explanation? Mistakes that do 
not call for explanation seem – absent some storytelling otherwise, at least – just as harmful to the 
relevant party, just as detrimental to the relevant social interests, and so on, as mistakes that do call for 
explanation (Enoch et al. 2013: 214). 
 
But this point seems mistaken. If a court convicts a defendant erroneously, and the only 
response available is “you win some you lose some” because the court relied on statistical 
evidence to satisfy the burden, the court has wronged the defendant. If a person is convicted, 
found liable, searched, or arrested without participating in the alleged activity, this error ought 
arise from some abnormal feature. Plausibly justice – also public trust in the legal system – 
demands this.  
 
Smith’s account of the relationship between error and normic support, if correct, can further 
illuminate Thomson’s guarantee. He writes,  
                                                        
29  Gardiner (2017b) develops the claim that epistemic modal conditions supervene on other epistemic facts and 
are explanatorily less basic than those facts.   
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If one believes that a proposition p is true, based upon evidence that normically supports it then, while 
one’s belief is not assured to be true, this much is assured: If one’s belief turns out to be false, then the 
error has to be explicable in terms of disobliging environmental conditions, deceit, cognitive or perceptual 
malfunction or some other interfering factor. In short, the error must be attributable to mitigating 
circumstances and thus excusable, after a fashion. Errors that do not fall into this category are naturally 
regarded as errors for which one must bear full responsibility – errors for which there is no excuse (Smith 
ms: 18, emphasis in original).  
 
According to Smith, if one’s evidence normically supports p, and one believes p based on that 
evidence, the person is not responsible for the error if p is false. I am doubtful of Smith’s 
claim concerning epistemic responsibility, since it seems evidence could normically support p, 
p not obtain, yet the error accrue to the person’s reasoning and be something the reasoner is 
responsible for. Suppose, for example, Oliver believes p, where p is “Jones murdered Jill.” He 
believes this because Jones’s clothes are bloodstained. Oliver’s belief is thus based upon 
evidence that normically supports p. But Jones believes p because he is confident that only 
butchers wear bloody clothes and butchers are angry and murderous. In this case, the evidence 
normically supports p, and Oliver believes p because of that evidence, but the error 
nonetheless accrues to Oliver’s poor reasoning. If Oliver had reasoned better, he may well 
have realized Jones’s innocence. 
 
Even if Smith’s claim about the relationship between normic support and epistemic 
responsibility is incorrect, a normalcy-based epistemic support relation might plausibly 
illuminate the sense of “guarantee” generated by individualized evidence: When a conclusion 
normally follows from the evidence, perhaps the evidence does not merely probabilify the 
conclusion, it also entails that if the evidence is true, and yet the conclusion false, something 
is amiss and abnormal. Perhaps this approaches the kind of guarantee demanded by legal 
burdens of proof.30   
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